Download as a PDF

36. C. Meadows. The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview. Journal of logic programming, 26(2):113{131, 1996.
37. J. Meseguer. Conditional rewriting logic as a unied model of concurrency. Theoretical Computer Science, 96(1):73{155, 1992.
38. J. Meseguer. Membership algebra as a logical framework for equational specication. In F. Parisi-Presicce, editor, Proc. WADT'97, pages 18{61. Springer LNCS
1376, 1998.
39. J. Millen. On the freedom of decryption. Information Processing Letters, 86(3),
2003.
40. J. Mitchell, M. Mitchell, and U. Stern. Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Murphi. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer
Society, 1997.
41. L. C. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer Security, 6(1-2):85{128, 1998.
42. M. Rusinowitch and M. Turuani. Protocol insecurity with a nite number of
sessions and composed keys is NP-complete. In 14th IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop, pages 174{190, 2001.
43. P. Y. A. Ryan and S. A. Schneider. An attack on a recursive authentication
protocol. a cautionary tale. Inf. Process. Lett., 65(1):7{10, 1998.
44. S. Santiago, C. Talcott, S. Escobar, C. Meadows, and J. Meseguer. A graphical user interface for Maude-NPA. Technical Report DSIC-II/02/09, Universidad
Politecnica de Valencia, June 2009.
45. V. Shmatikov and U. Stern. Ecient nite-state analysis for large security protocols. In 11th Computer Security Foundations Workshop | CSFW-11. IEEE
Computer Society Press, 1998.
46. S. Stubblebine and C. Meadows. Formal characterization and automated analysis of known-pair and chosen-text attacks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in
Communications, 18(4):571{581, 2000.
47. TeReSe, editor. Term Rewriting Systems. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2003.
48. P. Thati and J. Meseguer. Symbolic reachability analysis using narrowing and its
application verication of cryptographic protocols. J. Higher-Order and Symbolic
Computation, 20(1{2):123{160, 2007.
51