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(e.g., predicate-argument structure, countability, animacy, hierarchy) that are used
universally in structuring our conceptual systems (…) where specific conceptual units
are shared, we should construct cross-system mappings.
What would justify characterizing some conceptual content as a necessary
feature of all human language? Green referred to Immler (1991) who took up a variety
of meanings purported to exist in all human (he chose 18 languages) — for example,
the distinctions between light and dark and between alive and dead— and then
suggests “no human society could afford not to be able to express these ideas in its
language” (pp. 39-40), Cited by Green (2002: 18). “cognitive contents can be universal
across all cultures and all languages— they will be universal to the extent that the real
world around us , which is the same for humans all over the world , is the object of
cognition” argues Immler.
This idea resonates with the assumption according to which, in the
communication process, as well as in the case of interoperability, perception and
cognition play a leading role in building, structuring, and disseminating human
information. Human communication begins when someone wants to transmit
information in their mind to someone else. As such, cognitive models are basic
elements of human-to-human communication (Brodeur et al. 2003)
Green, Bean, & Hudon, (2002: 311-312), in their seminal paper suggested that
“conceptual units shared by many languages are more likely to occur at the basic level
than at hierarchical levels above or below the basic level” suggest that the “best we
can do in integrating two knowledge-based schemes is to construct such crosswalks
as are truly appropriate and then rely on the individual structures of the schemes being
“integrated.” Knowledge of these conceptual universals can at least facilitate the very
considerable work that knowledge integration will always require”.
The assumption that meanings are given in a language, and that subjects can
be constructed by a universal set of semantic universals given by natural languages
has been questioned by Hjørland (2003: 109) when he posited that: “The basic
assumptions and attitudes have been that the basic units of KO are semantic relations
between concepts. Such semantic relations cannot primarily be established by
universalistic assumptions, but much primarily be understood as domain specific, as
uncovered by (and constructed by) scientific disciplines”. But we believe however, that
our assumption makes sense while attempting to build general framework for
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