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2.4. KEY MANAGEMENT
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3. To OSI Systems Management:
• Modification
• Replay
• Masquerade
• Unauthorized modification of management information base
4. For all applications, vulnerabilities exist to Denial of Service attacks on
the ATN which impact Air Traffic Control Messages including:
• Jamming air-ground links
• Flooding the ATN with data packets
• Causing switches and data links to fail.
• Unauthorized modification of routing information.
These are to be addressed by network design and topology, and physical
access security, which should be considered by regional planning bodies, and
by appropriate mechanisms implemented by the ATN Internet.
As a result of this work, it is believed that application messages need to
be protected by digital signatures providing both authentication of the sender
and a high quality data integrity check. Furthermore, the source of routing
information needs also to be similarly authenticated.
We can summarize the Security Requirements for ATN:
• Authentication of Message Source
– protect against misreporting
– protect against masquerade of controllers
• Message Integrity Check
– protect against message substitution
– protect against message replay
• Authenticate source of routing information
– protect against false route
2.4 Key Management
[6] mentions: ICAO ATN Panel sent a letter inviting AEEC to develop specifications for Key Management in ATN. Reference: ICAO ATN SARPS 9705 Ed.
3. The elements of the ICAO request are:
• ATNP needs a suitable mechanism for secure installation and update of
the aircraft private keys in the context of data link information security.
• ATN security mechanisms require support of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
c Eurocontrol, June 2004.
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